By Robbin Laird
This is the latest in a series of semi-regular columns tackling current defense issues through the lens of over 45 years of expertise in the U.S. and abroad. The goal: to evaluate how the lessons of the past must inform the strategic decisions of today.
In the intricate, high-pressure world of Naval Aviation, Rear Adm. Max “Pepper” McCoy, the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA), views his command not as a static bureaucracy, but as a factory conveyor belt. For McCoy, the ultimate metric of success is operational fluidity: the system is either working, or it is pooling. Right now, by his own candid assessment, the pools are forming in several dangerous locations at once, forcing the Navy to conduct emergency triage and long-term modernization simultaneously.
On August 10, 2026, I sat down with McCoy to dissect what it takes to re-engineer a training pipeline from the inside while the operational demands on the aviators emerging from the other end continue to skyrocket. Our conversation, rooted in a professional history dating back to the F-35 program’s infancy and his command of Carrier Strike Group Four, was less of a formal briefing and more of a strategic dialogue on how to build a sustainable, repeatable, and lethal pipeline for combat-ready naval aviators.
The Core Challenge: A System Under Duress
For nearly a decade, CNATRA has labored under a persistent production deficit. The root causes are systemic, largely anchored to the aging T-45 Goshawk training fleet. The imbalance between student throughput and aircraft availability created a massive backlog—a phenomenon widely documented as the “pre-NIFE pool.” This is the queue of newly commissioned officers waiting in limbo just to begin the eight-and-a-half-week Naval Introductory Flight Evaluation (NIFE) in Pensacola.
While my predecessor, Rear Admiral Richard T. Brophy Jr., successfully drove production to 105 percent of requirements across various type-model-series, the victory was pyrrhic. By solving the bottleneck at the front end, the Navy merely exposed a new, more severe constraint at the back end. The Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS)—the final gate before a pilot reaches the fleet—are now underproducing.
The result is a cascading failure. Students arrive late to their first tour, but career milestones are fixed by time-in-service. Consequently, the Navy loses the ability to extract a full, productive tour from these junior officers before they are rotated to disassociated sea tours or reassigned to bridge gaps elsewhere. The system is, in McCoy’s stark phrasing, “feeding on itself.”
The Strategy: Time-to-Train vs. Production Percentage
McCoy has shifted the command’s philosophy away from chasing abstract production percentages toward a more rigorous metric: “time-to-train against entitlement.” This represents the optimal interval between commissioning and fleet arrival.
“If we compress the time-to-train,” McCoy explains, “first-tour officers complete their sea tours on schedule. They then roll into full-length production tours before they are pulled for disassociated sea duty. This is how we break the cycle.”
To manage this, McCoy utilizes a three-legged stool: airplanes, instructors, and students. Currently, none of these legs are stable. There are too few aircraft, a chronic shortage of instructors, and paradoxically, too many students—not because the Navy is over-accessing, but because the pipeline is so sluggish that students are effectively "pooling" rather than progressing.
The Governance Gap
McCoy serves as the single accountable flag officer for the “Street to Fleet” process, yet his authority is not monolithic. The schools command remains under the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), while the FRS squadrons fall under the purview of Type Wing commanders. McCoy’s role is to act as the strategic orchestrator, determining which levers to pull across the enterprise to restore the “North Star”—the number of ready-for-training aircraft required to meet the daily flight schedule.
The Instructor Dilemma and Innovation
The instructor shortage is perhaps the most acute vulnerability. McCoy’s cadre is traditionally comprised of first-sea-tour rollers, supplemented by permanent flight instructors, reserves, and personnel from the Marine Corps and Coast Guard.
To bridge the gap, McCoy is leaning heavily on "SERGRADs"—selectively retained graduate wingers who serve as instructors while awaiting their FRS seat. Currently, 15 Marine SERGRADs are flying jet training at Kingsville and Meridian, a move that allows experienced, veteran instructors to focus on advanced-phase training. Furthermore, McCoy is expanding the use of contract instructor pilots—former Navy and Marine jet aviators—into the primary training phase. This allows him to prioritize active-duty, combat-experienced instructors for the FRS, where the need for mentorship is most critical.
The Role of LVC
During our discussion, McCoy emphasized that Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) training is not a replacement for flight time, but a necessary complement. The objective is to use ground-based systems to ensure that when a student finally climbs into the cockpit, they possess the foundational habits required for "first-pass yield."
“LVC only delivers value when it is woven into the curriculum,” McCoy noted. “It cannot be a bolted-on module. It must be a foundational element of the syllabus.”
The Age of Urgency: A New Philosophy of Standards
We are living in an “age of urgency,” a security environment where the traditional, comfortable distinctions between peace and crisis have evaporated. A training system built on the assumption that there is "time to catch up later" is no longer viable. The fleet requires a dynamic, threat-responsive training architecture.
McCoy’s approach to this reality is a return to rigorous standards. He has implemented faster triggers for attrition at the NIFE and Primary stages. By raising the bar early, the Navy ensures that only the most capable candidates reach advanced training.
“My obligation to the students is a reciprocal contract,” McCoy says. “I owe them the best possible training environment and total clarity on expectations. In return, they owe me their full effort. It is about being firm, fair, and consistent.”
This focus on standardization is a direct reflection of his background as a TOPGUN graduate and former NAWDC commander. He insists on reverse-engineering the pipeline: starting with the requirements of a first-tour officer in the fleet and working backward to ensure every stage of training is purpose-built to meet that end-state.
Implications: Cultural Integrity and the Path Forward
McCoy remains steadfast in his refusal to outsource the soul of naval aviation. While he utilizes contracted logistics and instruction, he maintains a firm hand on the culture. The Contract Operated Primary Training-Rotary program is his model for success: civilian-contracted training, but supervised by a Navy O-5, with a constant flow of active-duty personnel to reinforce the cultural norms that a syllabus alone cannot transmit.
Perhaps the most optimistic development is the impending arrival of aviators returning from recent deployments as genuine combat veterans. Their transition into the instructor cadre will provide a level of mentorship that is impossible to replicate in a textbook.
Conclusion: Triage as a Prelude to Modernization
McCoy is under no illusions. He knows that performing radical surgery on a system while it is running is fraught with risk. His current tenure is defined by triage—making the machine function under extreme duress—but his eyes are fixed on the horizon.
His goal is clear: to hand his successor a pipeline with the right number of aircraft, a fully manned instructor corps, and a time-to-train interval that meets the nation’s requirements. By stabilizing the foundation today, McCoy is laying the groundwork for a future where the Naval Aviation Enterprise can focus not on surviving the pipeline, but on mastering the future of maritime warfare. As he puts it, "You cannot build a dynamic, threat-responsive architecture on top of a system that is still struggling to put pilots in seats."
